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bstract
There is little evidence on the effect of banking development on firm creation in the small firm sector. This paper examines whether differences
n banking sector penetration across Indian districts explain the differences in firm start-ups in Indian informal sector. Our empirical strategy lies in
xamining the effect of the spread of banking facilities at the district level on new firm formation in the informal sector for the period 1994–1995
o 2010–2011. Our results confirm that local bank availability is associated with significant increase in enterprises in the informal sector and the
ffect is more pronounced for larger enterprises in the sector.
 2014 Africagrowth Institute. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. 
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The regional dimension of entrepreneurship has been a sub-
ect of great importance to scholars of regional development (see
or example, Acs and Storey, 2004; Acs and Armington, 2004).
mall firms are an important source of economic dynamism and
articularly job creation, and the formation of such firms can be
 crucial determinant of economic growth and employment gen-
ration, especially in lagging regions (Fritsch, 1997; Audretsch
nd Thurik, 2004; Parker, 2004; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2004).
istorically, in most countries, whether in the developed or
eveloping world, rates of new firm formation differ signif-
cantly across regions within the same country (Keeble and
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.alker, 1994; Braunerhjelm and Borgman, 2004). Such vari-
tion in the rate of new firm formation is often seen as a cause of
ide divergence across regions in the same country in economic
rowth and employment opportunities, and can become a matter
f significant policy concern for policy-makers.
Why do we see such wide regional variations in new firm for-
ation? While an emerging literature has attempted to address
his question, we still do not know enough on what explains
he regional dimension of new firm creation, and what govern-
ents can do to promote new firm creation in the more backward
egions (O’Farrell, 1986; Armington and Acs, 2002). As Acs and
torey (2004) argue, “the instruments available – such as gov-
rnment assistance programme, local expenditure patterns or
ven political parties – seemed to exert little or no explanatory
ower” (p. 872). One crucial determinant of new firm creation
s the availability of external finance. The theoretical literature
ostulates an unambiguous positive relationship between the
asing of credit constraints on entrepreneurs and the rate of new
rm formation (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; King and Levine,
993). While much of the previous literature has studied other
eterminants of the spatial variations in new firm creation such
s agglomeration economies, demographic structure, infrastruc-
ure and human capital (see for example, Bartik, 1989; Ellison
nd Glaeser, 1999; Bonte et al., 2009; Ellison et al., 2010; Doms
t al., 2010), there has been less research on the role that bank-
ng development can play in explaining why rates of new firm
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reation differ so starkly across regions in a single country.1
his is a crucial omission – the empirical literature on banking
evelopment finds a strong positive effect of the latter on busi-
ess start-ups (Parker, 2002; Cassar, 2004) and at the same time,
evels of banking development differ greatly within countries,
roviding a clear reason why banking development may matter
or regional variations in new firm creation (Guiso et al., 2004).
n this paper, we attempt to rectify this omission in the literature
y examining whether banking development exerts a positive
ffect on new firm creation.
Another significant omission in the literature on the regional
imension of new firm creation, especially in the developing
ountry context, has been the relative neglect of the informal
ector in the analysis of new firm creation. This is a surpris-
ng omission, given the large presence of the informal sector
n developing countries. For instance, the ILO (2002) estimates
hat 48 per cent of workers in North Africa, 72 per cent in Sub-
aharan Africa, 51 per cent in Latin America and 65 per cent
n Asia, are employed in the informal economy. De Soto (2000)
rgues that many entrepreneurs in developing economies pre-
er to be in the informal sector, as the bureaucratic procedures
nvolved in permission to set up a business in the formal sec-
or discourages nascent entrepreneurs. The informal sector is the
referred site where many entrepreneurs would like to start their
perations, and it is often the sector where the most dynamism
nd creativity among small firms can be found in developing
conomies (Prahalad, 2005; Maiti and Sen, 2010). Yet it is usu-
lly the entrepreneurs in the informal sector who are most likely
o be credit constrained and dependent on external finance, as
hese entrepreneurs generally tend to be low-wealth, and there-
ore, not having the necessary savings to start an operation on
heir own funds (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Parker, 2002;
urst and Lusardi, 2004). Since entrepreneurs in the informal
ector would not be able to borrow from bond or stock markets
hat are not geographically confined, they would have to rely
n local financial intermediaries for their sources of funds for
nvestment. In this case, greater outreach of banking facilities
ould certainly be expected to have a significant role to play in
xplaining variation in new firm creation across regions in the
ame country.
In this paper, we examine the role of banking development
n explaining new firm formation in the informal manufactur-
ng sector of a developing country. The country we study is
ndia, where about 80 per cent of manufacturing employment
nd 17 per cent of manufacturing output is in the informal sec-
or (NCEUS, 2007). India provides an ideal context to study the
elationship between banking development and new firm cre-
tion in the informal sector for four reasons. Firstly, regional
evelopment is very uneven in India, with more prosperous
ndian states having per capita incomes that are close to five
imes that of the poorest states, and there has been an increase in
1 An exception is de Guevara and Maudos (2009), who investigated the role of
egional financial development on firm growth in Spanish provinces and found
hat firms in industries with a greater dependence on external finance grew faster
n more financially developed provinces.
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egional growth divergence since the economic reforms of 1991
Ramaswamy, 2007; Nayyar, 2008). The location of informal
anufacturing enterprises also shows a highly uneven regional
istribution (Ghani et al., 2011). Secondly, while the Indian
overnment actively promoted an equitable spread of financial
nstitutions till 1991 under a system of branch licensing policy
or nationalised commercial banks which made it mandatory for
hese banks to open branches in rural and semi-urban areas and
emote regions of the country, this policy has been considerably
eakened since the financial liberalisation enacted as part of the
991 economic reforms. This may have led to greater inequal-
ty in banking development in more recent years (Burgess and
ande, 2005; Cole, 2009). Thirdly, the analysis of the determi-
ants of new firm creation across regions within a country allows
or institutional, legal and cultural factors to be more adequately
ontrolled for, since there are fewer differences among regions
han among countries (de Guevara and Maudos, 2009). Finally,
he country has witnessed an increase in the number of enter-
rises in the informal sector during the period 1994–2011. The
ountry has also witnessed significant financial deepening as the
umber of bank branches have went up considerably during the
ame period.2 This permits us to investigate whether spread of
anking facilities can be a factor responsible for the increase in
umber of small firms in India.
In this paper, we use district level data for India to exam-
ne whether the differences in banking sector penetration can
xplain variation in rates of firm start-ups in Indian districts. We
se number of enterprises in the informal sector as a proxy to cap-
ure new firm creation at the district level. Our period of analysis
s 1994–2011. One innovative feature of our analysis is that we
lso test for the relationship between banking sector outreach and
rm entry among firms that employ both family and hired work-
rs. Analysing the effects of banking development separately for
hese firms allows us to assess whether finance constraints are
ore binding among some organisational forms in the informal
ector than others (that employ only family labour).
We use a rich data-set of large representative surveys of infor-
al firms for the period 1994–1995 to 2010–2011. We find that
anking development promotes new firm creation and aids firm
rowth in the informal sector in India. The effect is more pro-
ounced among larger firms employing both family and hired
abour.
The rest of the paper is in five sections. In the next section,
e summarise related literature on the credit-start-ups linkage
nd on the regional dimension of new firm creation in India. In
ection 3 we provide a brief discussion of financial policies in
ndia. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy employed in
he study, and provides a description on the data and the vari-mpirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 The data indicates that the number of enterprises in the informal sector which
ere 12 million in 1994-1995 increased to 17.2 million in 2010-2011. The same
eriod also witnessed an increase in number of bank branches, from 63,817 in
995–1992, 117 in 2011.
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.  Related  literature
.1.  Finance  and  new  ﬁrm  creation
A very rich empirical literature has shown that that the
evelopment of a country’s financial sector greatly facilitates
ts economic growth (Goldsmith, 1969; Shaw, 1973; King and
evine, 1993; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine et al., 2000).
 deeply spread banking sector is a clear indicator of a well-
eveloped financial sector of a country. Particularly in low
ncome countries, banks still constitute the largest component
f financial system – for example, in India, about 49 per cent
f external funds for small and medium firms come from banks
nd term-lending institutions (NSSO, 2008).3 The greater spread
f banking infrastructure can make significant impact on eco-
omic growth by facilitating more business start-ups and greater
ntrepreneurial activity (Parker, 2004; Beck et al., 2005). From
 theoretical standpoint, banking development can positively
ffect entrepreneurial activity in three ways. Firstly, a greater
pread of banking facilities implies that more resources are
obilised to finance entrepreneurial activity (King and Levine,
993). Secondly, a more deeper banking sector penetration
llows for the better screening of prospective entrepreneurs and
he choice of more promising projects that are likely to succeed
Paulson and Townsend, 2004). Thus, financial intermediaries
re better able to assess the ability of the entrepreneur to succeed
ith the proposed project and are less likely to reject low-wealth
ut high-ability investors who are not able to offer a high level
f collateral when borrowing from these intermediaries (Hurst
nd Lusardi, 2004). Thirdly, presence of more developed bank-
ng sector allow entrepreneurs to diversify risk from innovative
ctivities that lead to better functioning financial systems, allow-
ng them to take on more risky but high return projects.
The empirical evidence on whether banking development has
 strong positive effect on entrepreneurial activity is limited.
vailable limited evidence, however, points to a positive rela-
ionship between high entry barriers and lower use of lending
nd deposit services of banks (Beck et al., 2007). Among the
ew studies that have studied the effect of banking develop-
ent on new firm creation, Paulson and Townsend (2004) find
hat liquidity constraints play an important role in determining
ho becomes an entrepreneur, using data from rural Thailand.
ghion et al. (2007) find that deeper and more developed bank-
ng sectors are associated with higher entry of small firms in
ectors which are more dependent on external finance. In the
ndian case, Bell and Rousseau (2001) find a positive relation-
hip between banking development and industrialisation using
ime-series data from 1950 to 1990 but do not directly study the
ffect of banking development on entrepreneurial activity.
.2.  Other  determinants  of  new  ﬁrm  creation
Agglomeration economies are widely seen as being the most
mportant determinant of why new firms locate in regions where
3 Only 16 per cent of the financial needs of small and medium firms were met
rom money lenders, friends and relatives.
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ther firms are present, and why we see clear spatial cluster-
ng of entrepreneurial activity (Henderson, 1988). Firms tend to
luster together in regions with good access to markets, lead-
ng to greater external economies of scale, through the use of
pecialised labour and investment in cost reducing technolo-
ies (Lall et al., 2004). Beyond the firm level, agglomeration
conomies can also be driven by industry and regional factors.
ndustry benefits would include access to specialised know-
ow (i.e. knowledge diffusion), the presence of buyer–supplier
etworks, and opportunities for efficient subcontracting (Lall
t al., 2004). Employees with industry-specific skills will
e attracted to such clusters giving firms access to a larger
pecialised labour pool. At the regional level, agglomeration
conomies would accrue from easier access to complementary
ervices (e.g. publishing, advertising, banking), and information
ransfers between industries.
In addition to agglomeration economies, the literature has
lso identified human capital, infrastructure and social and
ultural factors as being important determinants of the spa-
ial variation in new firm creation. Armington and Acs (2002)
rgue for the importance of human capital and the propensity
f locally available knowledge to stimulate innovative activ-
ty which culminates in new firm formations. Highly educated
opulations provide the human capital embodied in their gen-
ral and specific skills for implementing new ideas for creating
ew businesses. They also create an environment rich in local
nowledge spillovers, which support another mechanism by
hich new firm start-ups are initiated and sustained (Ozer,
008). The availability of good quality infrastructure such as
oads and telecommunication links would play an important role
hy firms prefer to locate in regions with high levels of infras-
ructural services. Social factors such as the orientation of the
opulation towards risk-taking activities and norms and social
alues that reward self-employment rather than wage employ-
ent would also be important in explaining why some regions
ithin a country tend to see higher entrepreneurial activity than
thers.
In the Indian context, several studies have shown the
mportance of agglomeration economies, human capital
nd infrastructure in determining the spatial variation in
ntrepreneurial activities. For example, Ghani et al. (2011) find
hat the incumbent composition of manufacturing influence new
rm entry, and that educational levels and infrastructure matter in
ostering greater new firm creation. Kambhampati and Mccann
2007) find strong positive effects of agglomeration economies
n the regional performance of Indian industry. Lall et al. (2004)
nd significant concentration of manufacturing firms in large
ities, driven in part by the presence of transport infrastructure
inking these cities to domestic markets. With the exception of
hani et al. (2011), these studies do not look at the spatial deter-
inants of new firm creation in the informal sector, and none
f these studies examine the role of banking development in
xplaining regional variations in new firm creation. This omis-
ion is significant, given the changes in Indian financial policies
ince the 1990s, which may have led to greater inequality in
pread of bank facilities across regions. We turn to these policies
ext.
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where ENTdt is our measure of new firm creation in district d
and in year t. We use number of informal sector enterprises to
represent new firm creation at the district level.5 Our variable
4 Burgess and Pande (2005) show branch expansion into rural unbanked areas
significantly reduced rural poverty, though the branch expansion programme left
urban poverty outcomes unaffected.
5 Guiso et al. (2004) employed a similar indicator (number of firms per capita)
to assess the role of local financial development on firm creation in Italy. Ideally,S.N. Rajesh Raj et al. / Review of 
.  Financial  policies  in  India
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Indian financial sector operated
n a fairly liberal environment. This period saw the consolidation
f the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in its role as the agency in
harge of the supervision and control of banks. An important
eature of the banking sector during the period 1951–1968 was
hat a large proportion of bank credit went to the industrial sector,
nd within it, to the large borrowers, with the agricultural sector
etting a little over 2 per cent of bank credit. There was a growing
ealisation among Indian policy-makers that there was a need for
xtensive social control of the Indian banking system. In July
969, as a consequence, 14 of the largest commercial banks were
ationalised (Sen and Vaidya, 1997).
The evolution of the Indian financial sector beginning from
969 can be divided into two distinct sub-periods: first, a period
f financial repression from the early seventies to the mid-
980s; second, from 1991, a period of an increasingly liberalised
nancial sector. In the first period, the Indian government’s inter-
ention in financial markets began with the nationalisation of 14
rivate sector banks in 1969 followed by the nationalisation of
ix more private sector banks in 1980. The primary objective of
he nationalisation was to ensure that credit availability matched
he wider development objectives of the government (Gupta
t al., 2011). Banks were increasingly pressurised to lend to
he “priority sector”, comprising agriculture and allied activities,
mall-scale industry, retail trade, transport operators, profession-
ls and craftsmen. This meant that more credit was available
o small-scale firms. At the same time, there was an increas-
ng recourse to the banking sector via mandatory investment
y commercial banks in government securities to finance the
ver-widening budget deficits of the central government in the
eventies and the eighties, possibly crowding out bank financing
f private investment. While the commercial banks essentially
rovided short term credit to small firms in the manufacturing
ector, long term loans to this group of firms were provided by
he Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) (Sen
nd Vaidya, 1997).
While social control of the banking sector may have led to
ncreasing inefficiency in the financial intermediation process
Athukorala and Sen, 2002), there was significant growth in the
ommercial banking system in the country both in geographi-
al coverage and amount of resources mobilised. This was in
reat part due a strictly enforced branch licensing policy fol-
owed by the RBI from 1977 onwards. Under this policy, the RBI
estricted banks from opening branches in urban and metropoli-
an areas. Instead, the thrust of branch expansion was mostly to
he ‘under-banked’ districts in rural and semi-urban areas. The
BI mandated that to obtain a license for a branch opening in a
ocation with one or more branches (a banked location), a bank
ust open branches in four eligible unbanked locations. The
olicy remained in place till 1990. In addition, to ensure that
anks did not concentrate their lending in urban areas, the RBI
equired that every bank branch maintained a credit–deposit ratio
f 60 per cent within its geographical area of operation (Burgess
nd Pande, 2005). Furthermore, in contrast to the experience
ith financial repression in other developing countries, the real
w
e
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ate of return on bank deposits has been positive more or less
ll through the 1970s and 1980s. Primarily due to the branch
icensing and real interest rate policies, there was a significant
nancial deepening in the Indian economy in the seventies and
ighties, with an increase in bank deposits as a percentage of
ational income from 15.3 in 1969 to 51.8 in 1994.4
In 1991, as a part of the IMF financed structural adjustment
rogramme, interest rates were deregulated and government reg-
lation of financial markets substantially reduced. The most
ignificant change in financial sector policies was the relaxation
f branch licensing policies by the RBI, with banks now allowed
o close down loss-making rural and semi-urban branches as well
s open branches in regions where there were already a large
resence of bank branches. Burgess and Pande (2005) show that
hile from 1977 to 1990, there was a rapid expansion of bank
ranches in financial underdeveloped states, there was a dra-
atic reversal in the regional dispersion of commercial banks
ince 1990, especially in rural unbanked areas. Combining a
efore–after evaluation strategy with a policy-induced cross-
ectional variation in the spread of banks, they find large effects
f rural banks in reducing poverty in the unbanked or deficit
tates in 1977–1990. In contrast, Kochar (2011) finds that expan-
ion of banking in rural areas has less of an effect on the poor as
ompared to the non-poor. Since most of the urban working poor
end to be either owning or employed in firms in the informal
ector, it is important to understand the effects of banking devel-
pment on new firm creation in the informal sector. Clearly, the
reater the increase in informal firms due to banking develop-
ent, the larger the effect we may expect of banking service
xpansion on poverty (Sen, 2014).
.  Empirical  speciﬁcation,  data  and  variables
.1.  Empirical  speciﬁcation
The focus of this study is to analyse the effect of banking
evelopment on new firm creation in the informal sector. To be
pecific, we examine whether the firm creation at the district
evel in the informal sector in India are driven by the spread
f banking facilities. To test this relationship, we estimate the
ollowing equation:
NTd,t =  β0 +  β1FINd,t +
∑
m>1
λmZd,t +  φt +  εd,t (1)e would have liked to use a panel of informal firms that capture firm entry and
xit. However, the NSSO data is in the form of repeated cross-sections, and the
dentities of firms are not provided, which does not allow us to construct a panel
f informal firms.
4  Deve
o
b
w
s
a
i
i
t
b
t
t
o
l
c
l
a
a
a
m
f
a
W
e
t
b
f
a
fi
f
t
I
1
t
t
s
c
r
t
w
T
u
u
v
a
d
w
A
d
o
w
t
t
c
d
e
r
m
e
w
t
4
t
u
p
a
f
p
(
T
a
s
v
a
n
a
p
u
e
d
s
p
c
o
e
s
d
t
R
fi
u
N
u
d
p
I
a2 S.N. Rajesh Raj et al. / Review of
f interest is FINdt, a measure of banking development (e.g.
ranch density) in district d  and in year t. The coefficient of β1
ould, therefore, capture the effect of banking development (or
pread of banking activities) on new firm creation. A positive
nd significant coefficient of β1 indicates that spread of bank-
ng activities promotes new firm creation in Indian districts. Z
s the vector of district level controls. Our district level con-
rols are the level of urbanisation in the district as measured
y the share of urban population in total population (URBAN),
he proportion of SC/ST in total population (SHSCSTPOP) and
he proportion of individuals who are educated at primary level
r below (PRIMEDU). We control for the possibility that the
evel of urbanisation and availability of better human capital
ould make a positive impact on new firm creation at the district
evel. SHSCSTPOP would control for the possibility that social
nd economic backwardness will negatively influence firm cre-
tion in the informal sector. We include year dummies, γd, to
ccount for the possibility that economy wide demand shocks
ay have an impact on new firm creation. The subscript d  stands
or district, s  for state and t  for time. We estimate Eq. (1) for
ll enterprises (that include both family and non-family firms).
e also separately estimate Eq. (1) for non-family firms that
mploy both family and hired labour (where we exclude firms
hat employ only family labour), to allow for the possibility than
anking development may affect firm creation in the very small
amily firms (which are less reliant on commercial bank loans,
nd mostly borrow from family, friends and informal sources of
nance such as money-lenders) differently than the larger non-
amily firms.6 District is our unit of analysis in this study. In
otal, by considering 364 districts covering 15 major states of
ndia and four years of data, we work with a dataset containing
456 observations.
A possible concern with the OLS estimates of Eq. (1) is that
he coefficient on FIN in these estimates would be biased due
o possible endogeneity of the variables that we use to mea-
ure banking development at the district level. For example,
ommercial banks may place their branches in most dynamic
egions as the demand for external funds would be higher in
hese regions. In this case, the presence of finance constraints
ould be endogenous to new firm formation in the district.
o address endogeneity concerns, we also estimate Eq. (1)
sing instrumental variable (IV) methods. As instruments we
se proportion of villages with paved approach road in total
illages in a district (ROADVILLAGE) and whether there is
 national highway or a broad gauge line passes through the
istrict (TRANSPORT). We use instrumental variables that
e believe capture the supply side of financial intermediation.
n important supply side consideration for financial interme-
iaries to place their branches in district is the preferences
f senior level staff of these intermediaries as to where they
ould like to be based. Important factors that will determine
he preferences of senior level staff of financial intermediaries
o take up residences in districts would be the access of the
6 Our estimates for the period 2005-2006 suggests that large non-family firms
onstitute about 15 per cent of total firms in the informal sector in India.
t
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istrict in terms of a major transportation link, and the pres-
nce of provision of better infrastructure, captured though better
oads, in the district. This set of instrumental variables will
eet the exclusion criteria as they would not have a direct
ffect on new firm creation over and above their indirect effect
orking through the presence of banking infrastructure in dis-
ricts.
.2.  Data
For the analysis, we combine the data on bank availability at
he district level with the district level data on the informal man-
facturing firms for the period 1994–1995 to 2010–2011, the
eriod for which complete unit level data on informal firms are
vailable. Data on the informal manufacturing sector are drawn
rom the surveys on the sector conducted by the National Sam-
le Survey Organisation (NSSO) in its 51st (1994–1995), 56th
2000–2001), 62nd (2005–2006) and 67th (2010–2011) rounds.
he NSSO is the agency that collects information on various
spects of the enterprises/units in the informal manufacturing
ector quinquennially. These are nationwide enterprise level sur-
eys covering all the Indian states and Union Territories (UTs)
nd are stratified by district. Since most informal enterprises are
ot registered with any government authority, the NSSO uses
 block enumeration approach to ensure a representative sam-
le of the informal sector in every district. We aggregate the
nit level data to the district level and arrive at the district level
stimates using the multipliers supplied by the NSSO in their
atasets.
The district level banking development variables for the
ame period are drawn from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
ublication, Basic Statistical Returns of Scheduled Commer-
ial Banks in India. These reports provide comprehensive data
n state-wise/district-wise distribution of branch offices, bank
mployees, number of deposits and amount deposited and out-
tanding credit of scheduled commercial banks in India. These
ata are collected through the annual statistical surveys from
he offices of scheduled commercial banks in India including
egional Rural Banks.
The NSSO surveys disclose the names of the districts in which
rms are located, and we merged the NSSO and the RBI datasets
sing a one-to-one mapping of 364 districts for the two datasets.
ew districts have been created in many states during the period
nder study. In order to facilitate comparison over time at the
istrict level, these new districts have been merged with their
arent districts. The study is confined to 15 major states of the
ndian Union.7 Thus our district level data cover 364 districts
cross 15 major states for 4 years.
Data on our district level control variables are obtained from
he 2001 Census of India.
7 The states included are Andhra Pradesh (AP), Assam, Bihar, Gujarat,
aryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh (MP), Maharashtra, Orissa, Pun-
ab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu (TN), Uttar Pradesh (UP), and West Bengal (WB).
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.3.  Variables
We use number of enterprises as proxy for new firm creation.8
s we are also interested in capturing the effect of external
nance on new firm creation across different organisational
orms in the informal sector, we also look at the effects of bank-
ng development on new firm creation for firms that employ
ired labour, besides examining the relationship for all firms.
Recent studies have developed several indicators to represent
he ability of financial intermediaries to improve loan monitor-
ng and screening. One indicator that is frequently used in the
iterature on banking is branch density (Jayaratne and Strahan,
996; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; D’Onofrio and Murro, 2013).
he justification comes from the fact that physical proximity
mproves the quality of screening and monitoring of borrow-
rs, making these actions less costly (Petersen and Rajan, 2002;
resbitero and Rebelotti, 2014).9 We use a variety of measures
f banking development, including branch density (number of
ank branches divided by population) to check for the robust-
ess of our results. The other measures we use are bank accounts
er capita (number of bank accounts divided by population),
ank amount per capita (amount outstanding divided by popula-
ion) and bank credit per capita (credit amount outstanding per
apita).10 All financial variables are transformed to their natural
ogarithmic values.
As control variables, we use three district level measures:
RBAN, PRIMEDU and SHSCSTPOP. URBAN represents the
evel of urbanisation in the district where the firm is located, as
easured by the share of urban population in total population.
RIMEDU captures the proportion of individuals who are edu-
ated at primary level or below and SHSCSTPOP represents the
roportion of SC/ST population in total population.
.  Descriptive  statistics  and  results
.1.  Sources  of  funds  for  ﬁrms  in  the  Indian  informal
anufacturing  sector
We begin the empirical analysis by looking at the sources of
xternal funds for family and non-family firms. An important
eature of the changing financial landscape in India has been
he decline in the importance of informal sources of finance
ver time, which fell from 70.8 per cent in 1971 to 39.6 per
8 Many studies use self-employment as a measure of new firm creation
r equivalently, entrepreneurship (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Blanchflower
nd Oswald, 1998). However, as Ghani et al. (2011) point out restricting
ntrepreneurship only to self-employment will not include enterprises that cre-
te employment for others. In our case, self-employed category corresponds to
rms that employ only family labour (henceforth, family firms). The firms that
mploy both family and hired labour (henceforth, non-family firms) are impor-
ant in job creation in informal sector. For this reason, we did not confine our
easure of entrepreneurship to family firms and included non-family firms as
ell.
9 However, a limitation of the measure of branch density is that it may be
ncreasingly misleading with the introduction of branchless banking.
10 Kumar et al. (2005) uses credit per capita and deposits per capita as an
lternative measure of supply of financial institutions to examine the trends in
nancial access in Brazil.
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ent as a share of total debt (Tsai, 2004). This has been a con-
equence of the government requirement to banks to lend to
mall enterprises and agricultural households as well as the
andated branch expansion policy where the Reserve Bank of
ndia required banks to open branches in under-banked rural and
emi-urban areas.11 We see from Table 1 that informal firms
re heavily reliant on external funds both from institutional and
on-institutional sources, and this is true of both family and
on-family firms. In 2010–2011, institutional agencies provided
0.5 per cent of all loans to family firms, and the correspond-
ng figure for non-family firms was 73.3 per cent (Table 1).
 large proportion of borrowing from institutional sources was
rom commercial banks. Informal firms also depended on money
enders and friends and relatives for funds to finance their busi-
ess related operations. In 2010–2011, money lenders provided
4.3 per cent of all loans to all informal firms while 6.9 per
ent of all loans originated from friends and relatives (Table 1),
ith family firms were more reliant on these two sources of
unding than non-family firms. We observe that microfinance
s not an important source of funds for informal firms, as evi-
ent from Table 2, where the share of microfinance in total
oans is only 0.8 per cent, as compared to around 55 per cent
rom commercial banks (data on informal firm borrowing from
icrofinance institutions is only available for 2010–2011). In the
ndian case, microfinance primarily takes the form of self-help
roups (SHGs) organised by low caste women in rural areas
usually, 10–12 women per group) (Shah et al., 2007). These
roups help members to save funds on a regular basis and cre-
te an internal insurance fund for members to draw from in
ase of emergencies (Tsai, 2004). The SHGs in turn have link-
ges to banks, who lend directly to them or indirectly through
on-governmental organisations. On the whole, we see that a
ignificant proportion of external funds for informal firms come
rom term-lending institutions including commercial banks and
ther institutional agencies, either directly or indirectly. Other
ays of accessing funds for informal enterprises that have been
bserved in developing countries such as mobile banking have
ot yet gained currency (in spite of a phenomenal growth in the
se of mobile phones especially in urban areas),12 though this
ay change rapidly over time, with greater government push
owards financial inclusion for the poor in rural areas.13
.2.  Descriptive  statisticsWe begin the empirical analysis by presenting the summary
tatistics for the main dependent and independent variables used
11 However, Sen and Ghosh (2005) note that the share of lending to small
nterprises in total bank lending to priority sectors may have declined over time.
12 As the RBI’s Financial Stability Report (2013) notes, the growth and accep-
ance of mobile banking has been below expectation in India. The problems the
eport identifies are low levels of awareness and acceptance, inability of the bank
o seed the mobile number with the account number, handset compatibility with
he mobile banking application, absence of collaboration and revenue sharing
odels between banks and mobile network operators and inability to get the
SD channel in operation for mobile banking.
13 At present, the use of mobile banking, even for urban areas, is very low and
s estimated to be at 14 per cent for urban households (Gandhi, 2010).
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Table 1
Loan share by source and enterprise type, 2000–2001 and 2010–2011.
Source of loan 2000–2001 2005–2006 2010–2011
Family
firms
Non-family
firms
All firms Family
firms
Non-family
firms
All firms Family
firms
Non-family
firms
All firms
Institutional agencies such as
central and state level term
lending institutions,
government and
commercial banks
60.4 70.0 69.7 47.7 58.5 58.3 58.9 72.0 71.6
Other institutional agencies 2.3 4.3 4.2 4.3 7.0 6.9 1.6 1.3 1.3
Money lenders 21.0 9.8 10.2 16.5 10.2 10.4 25.3 13.9 14.3
Business partner(s) 0.2 2.4 2.3 2.2 6.7 6.6 0.1 2.3 2.2
Suppliers/contractors 2.6 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.5 1.3 1.4
Friends and relatives 12.1 8.0 8.1 21.0 8.4 8.7 9.6 6.8 6.9
Others 1.4 2.8 2.8 6.2 6.9 6.9 2.1 2.3 2.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Authors’ estimates based on 56th, 62nd and 67th NSSO Survey rounds for the periods, 2000–2001, 2005–2006 and 2010–2011 respectively.
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ncluded under the category “other institutional agencies”.
n our analysis in Table 3. Our dependent variables are number
f firms (lntotent) and number of non-family firms (lnhirent).
e find that average number of firms and non-family firms at
he district level are 26,290 (exponential of 10.18) and 2607
exponential of 7.87). With regard to our four indicators of
anking development, we find that the average number of bank
ranches per capita, bank accounts per capita, bank amounts per
apita and credits per capita are 0.00006, 0.3989, 4683.25 and
677.71, respectively. Table 3 also report the summary statistics
or the control variables and instruments used in the estima-
ion. On average, Scheduled Cates (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes
STs) constitute 25 per cent of the total population at the district
evel. Average educational attainment is found to be consider-
bly lower at the district level. Percentage of population that
as attained pre-primary or primary levels of education is very
able 2
oan share by source, 2010–2011.
ource of loan Share in total
loan
Share in total
enterprises
entral and state level term lending
institutions
1.3 0.8
overnment (central, state, local
bodies)
8.5 4.5
ommercial banks 54.9 30.1
o-operative banks and societies 6.1 10.0
icro-ﬁnance institutions 0.8 4.4
ther institutional agencies 1.3 2.5
oney lenders 14.3 31.4
usiness partner(s) 2.2 0.8
uppliers/contractors 1.4 5.2
riends and relatives 6.9 16.0
thers 2.3 2.4
otal 100.0 100.0
ource: Authors’ estimates based on 67th NSSO Survey round for the period,
010–2011. Similar break-up is not available for 56th and 62nd survey rounds.
ote: Loans advanced by institutions/agencies such as Khadi and Village Indus-
ries Commission, Life Insurance Corporation, Provident Fund and Chit Fund
re included under the category “other institutional agencies”.
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ow at 14 per cent. Interestingly 78 per cent of all districts are
onnected to a national highway or a broad-gauge railway line.
e also find that, on average, 61 per cent of villages have better
oad connectivity.
There is evidence to show that new firm formation is sys-
ematically linked to banking development. This relationship
etween banking development and firm formation at the district
evel for the Indian economy is better captured in Fig. 1. It is
ossible to notice that new firm creation (captured through for-
ation of new enterprises) is substantially lower in regions with
ow levels of banking development. This relationship is clearly
isible irrespective of the indicators that we used to capture the
evel of banking development. The descriptive analysis is sug-
estive and therefore, demands a much deeper analysis of the
otential interactions between banking development especially
ocal banking availability and new firm creation, which we do
ext.
We now move on to discuss the empirical results of our anal-
sis. We first present the OLS estimates in Table 4. We begin
ur analysis by estimating Eq. (1) for all enterprises, which con-
ists of family and non-family enterprises. We present the results
or our four alternative measures of bank availability – BKOF,
KACT, BKAMT and BKCRDT – in columns 1–4 of Table 4.
ur results clearly suggest that local banking availability and
ew firm creation are positively related. The coefficients are
ositive and significant at the 5 per cent level across all meas-
res of banking development (except for BKOF) suggesting that
ocal bank availability is associated with significant increase in
nterprises in the informal sector in India.14We repeat the analysis for non-family firms, which employ
oth family and hired labour. These are the larger enterprises
n the sector and our conjecture is that the effect will be more
14 This is similar to the finding by Brown et al. (2004) suggesting that access
o external credit increase the growth of both employment and sales in the small
rm sector in Romania.
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Table 3
Summary statistics.
Variables All enterprises
N Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
lntotent 1436 10.17695 1.000377 6.77308 13.21858
lnhirent 1436 7.866047 1.412399 1.098612 11.53389
Measures of banking development
BKOF 1436 0.00006 0.00003 0.00001 0.0002797
BKACT 1436 0.3988954 0.2756789 0.0333326 2.857369
BKAMT 1436 4683.25 10,560.75 127.1635 259,990.1
BKCRDT 1436 2677.707 9737.936 75.48553 259,337.1
Controls
SHSCSTPOP 1436 0.251429 0.132057 0.026295 0.896631
PRIMEDU 1436 0.14474 0.05121 0.059946 0.875199
URBAN 1436 0.247027 0.258656 0.034835 3.967106
ROADVILLAGE 1420 0.621351 0.253262 0.129032 1
T
S
F
c
SRANSPORT 1436 0.777159 
ource: Authors’ calculation from RBI and NSSO datasets.
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Table 4
Regression results: OLS estimates.
Variables Dep. var. = total enterprises Dep. var. = non-family enterprises
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
BKOF −0.1925**
(0.0925)
0.3225**
(0.1403)
BKACT 0.2269***
(0.0526)
0.8805***
(0.0803)
BKAMT 0.1501***
(0.0317)
0.4746***
(0.0454)
BKCRDT 0.1171***
(0.0299)
0.4680***
(0.0410)
Constant 8.1055***
(0.9614)
10.3523***
(0.1143)
8.9280***
(0.2449)
9.2997***
(0.2058)
10.8838***
(1.4983)
8.8279***
(0.1910)
4.1044***
(0.3449)
4.6574***
(0.2772)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.29 0.28 0.29
F value 10.02 24.31 26.12 24.18 63.25 124.57 135.38 144.09
N 1436 1436 1436 1436 1436 1436 1436 1436
Source: Authors’ estimates based on RBI and NSSO datasets.
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igures in parentheses are standard errors. *** and ** indicate significance at m
triking for these firms. Results presented in columns 5–8 of
able 4 unequivocally confirm the significant role of banking
evelopment in promoting entrepreneurial activities in large
nformal firms. The coefficients of all the four measures of dis-
rict level banking availability are positive and significant at the 5
er cent level suggesting that greater presence of banking facili-
ies leads to increase in the formation of large firms in the sector.
ore strikingly, the magnitudes of the coefficients on banking
vailability for non-family enterprises are higher than those for
ll enterprises, suggesting that banking development aids firm
reation in the larger non-family informal firms than for smaller
amily owned informal firms. This is in contrast to the existing
vidence in the literature which suggests that small firms tend
o benefit more with increase in access to finance as small firms
re financially more constrained than large firms (Angelini and
enerale, 2008; Beck et al., 2005; Beck, 2007; Kuntchev et al.,
012). One possible explanation of our results is that small firms
n the informal sector are family firms which do not employ any
ired labour. As suggested by Banerjee and Duflo (2008), these
amily firms are often in business simply because running a small
nterprise allows them to bring in additional income with little
dditional effort and they are unlikely to expand or invest in their
usinesses. On the other hand, the ‘big’ firms are more likely
o modify their behaviour in response to changes in local credit
arkets and therefore the effect of banking development will be
igher for these firms.
For reasons mentioned in Section 4, we also consider the
otential endogeneity of our measures of district level banking
evelopment. The Durbin–Hu–Hausman test (see in Table 5)
oes indicate the strong presence of the endogeneity of variables
epresenting district level bank availability. We thus estimate
q. (1) using instrumental variable (IV) method. As mentioned
efore, we use ROADVILLAGE and TRANSPORT as instru-
ents for our measures of finance constraint. We present IV
esults in Table 5. The various test statistics show that the IV pro-
edure works well for our estimations. The instruments pass the
B
t
oum 1% and 5% level respectively.
est for weak instruments, implying they are strongly correlated
ith our finance variables. This is important since weak instru-
ents can lead to severely biased estimates. Further, the Sargan
ver identification test statistic is insignificant for all the models,
onfirming that the instrumental variables are indeed exoge-
ous and correctly excluded from the performance equation. In
able 5, R-squared statistics is not reported since it has no natu-
al interpretation in IV regressions (O’Brien and David, 2009).
irst, IV method though produces better estimates of the ceteris
aribus effect of an endogenous variable on a dependent vari-
ble, overall goodness-of-fit of a model may very well decline
hen a variable is treated as endogenous (Wooldridge, 2003).
econd, it is inappropriate to check if including an endogenous
ariable in the model incrementally improves overall model fit
O’Brien and David, 2009).
For IV estimations too, we follow the same order in the spec-
fications that we test as in Table 4. In columns 1–4 of Table 5,
e report the results for all firms (family and non-family firms)
nd in columns 5–8, we report the results for non-family firms.
e find that the effect of district level banking development
n new firm creation is still positive and statistically significant
nd, more evidently, the use of instruments tends to increase
he magnitude of the coefficient. Our findings are thus essen-
ially robust with regard to endogeneity concerns, and we can
e rather confident that the district level banking development
ndeed promotes new firm creation in the informal sector.
We also find that the response of firms to presence of bank
acilities is significantly higher among large firms. This suggests
hat firms that already made the transition out of family labour
re in the greatest need of external finance and benefit the most
rom greater banking development. Across the coefficients of
ur four measures of banking development, BKOF and BKACT
eem to have a greater effect on new firm creation as compared to
KAMT and BKCRT. This indicates that the banking infrastruc-
ure may be more important for new firm entry than availability
f credit per se. Overall, our results show that district level bank
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Table 5
Regression results: IV estimates.
Variables Dep. var. = total enterprises Dep. var. = non-family enterprises
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
BKOF 1.2036***
(0.3462)
5.0263***
(0.7832)
BKACT 0.6455***
(0.1557)
2.6989***
(0.2649)
BKAMT 0.5364***
(0.1340)
2.2411***
(0.2515)
BKCRDT 0.3354***
(0.0791)
1.4021***
(0.1215)
Constant 21.9530***
(3.4708)
10.8300***
(0.2327)
6.2685***
(0.9208)
7.9415***
(0.4800)
57.8558***
(8.0297)
11.4102***
(0.4792)
−7.6497***
(1.6406)
−0.6630***
(0.6704)
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
F value 16.53 17.17 18.16 19.43 29.02 50.81 35.74 59.25
N 1420 1420 1420 1420 1420 1420 1420 1420
Presence of endogeneity (Durbin–Wu–Hausman test)
Chi2 23.1875
(0.0000)
8.9166
(0.0028)
10.1581
(0.0014)
9.8179
(0.0017)
119.173
(0.0000)
74.5713
(0.0000)
94.4769
(0.0000)
74.5785
(0.0000)
F 25.0501
(0.0000)
9.5129
(0.0021)
10.6375
(0.0011)
10.2615
(0.00014)
167.004
(0.0000)
102.876
(0.0000)
123.608
(0.0000)
92.3561
(0.0000)
Coefﬁcient values of instruments
TRANSPORT −0.0348
(0.0230)
0.0500
(0.0295)
−0.0229
(0.0436)
0.0394
(0.0416)
−0.0348
(0.0230)
0.0500
(0.0295)
−0.0229
(0.0436)
−0.0394
(0.0416)
ROADVILLAGE 0.4174***
(0.0596)
0.7776***
(0.0676)
0.9542***
(0.1053)
1.5188***
(0.1081)
0.4174***
(0.0692)
0.7776***
(0.0676)
0.9542***
(0.1053)
1.5188***
(0.1097)
Tests for validity of the instrument
Underidentification
test:
Kleibergen–Paaprk
LM statistic
(Chi2 P-value)
42.050
(0.000)
81.820
(0.000)
60.369
(0.000)
105.342
(0.000)
42.050
(0.000)
81.820
(0.000)
60.369
(0.000)
105.342
(0.000)
Weak identification
test:
Kleibergen–Paaprk
Wald F statistic
27.281 66.999 41.357 95.812 27.281 66.999 41.357 95.812
Sargan
(overidentification)
statistic
(Chi2 P-value)
1.127
(0.29)
0.004
(0.95)
0.525
(0.47)
0.123
(0.73)
5.121
(0.03)
0.051
(0.83)
3.631
(0.06)
1.382
(0.24)
Source: Authors’ estimates based on RBI and NSSO datasets.
Note: Controls are SHSCSTPOP, PRIMEDU and URBAN.
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vailability has a strong positive effect on new firm formation in
he informal manufacturing sector in India. We find that that the
ffect is the strongest for large firms which employ both fam-
ly and non-family workers as compared to small firms which
mploy only family workers.
.  Conclusions
In this paper, we examine whether the presence of bank
acilities exerts a positive influence on new firm creation. The
ountry we study is India, a geographically large country, with
lear and distinct variations in small firm growth and banking
evelopment. We focus on the effect of district level banking
evelopment on new firm creation in the informal manufactur-
ng sector in India, and ask whether the presence of financial
acilities and intermediaries make a difference in growth in the
m
aum 1% and 5% level respectively.
umber of informal firms using a panel data set and Indian dis-
ricts as units of analysis. We carry out the analysis for all firms
both family and non-family firms) and non-family firms sep-
rately to find out whether the effect is stronger for firms that
mploy hired labour. We find clear evidence of banking devel-
pment having a positive and significant effect on growth in the
umber of firms in the Indian informal manufacturing sector.
e also notice that the effect is most pronounced for those firms
hat employ hired labour suggesting that banking development
atters the most for the larger enterprises in the informal sec-
or. This perhaps indicates that larger enterprises need working
apital to grow, and greater access to external finance can con-
iderably help them in expanding their businesses by investing
ore in materials and workers.
Given the high level of regional inequality, and the wide vari-
tions in economic growth across states and regions in India, the
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mportance of banking development for new firm creation in the
nformal manufacturing sector in India deserves policy atten-
ion. This is particularly true in the current context where the
ndian economy has witnessed significant financial liberalisa-
ion and state-directed spread of bank branches in areas with
ow banking development is no longer a policy option. Tax and
ther incentives for financial intermediaries to open up offices in
nancially underdeveloped areas and support for micro-finance
rganisations that may be willing to lend to the smallest enter-
rises in the informal sector are possible policy initiatives that
ould be considered for a more equal distribution of financial
acilities across the country. If access to financial institutions
annot be made easier, an independent credit institution exclu-
ively for micro and small firms in the informal sector can be
stablished. The Grameen Bank of Bangladesh is a successful
xample of such an initiative (Raj, 2011).
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